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Explanation is a central concept in human psychology. Drawing upon philosophical
theories of explanation, psychologists have recently begun to examine the relationship
between explanation, probability and causality. Our study advances this growing
literature at the intersection of psychology and philosophy of science by systematically
investigating how judgments of explanatory power are affected by (i) the prior credibility
of an explanatory hypothesis, (ii) the causal framing of the hypothesis, (iii) the perceived
generalizability of the explanation, and (iv) the relation of statistical relevance between
hypothesis and evidence. Collectively, the results of our five experiments support the
hypothesis that the prior credibility of a causal explanation plays a central role in
explanatory reasoning: first, because of the presence of strongmain effects on judgments
of explanatory power, and second, because of the gate-keeping role it has for other
factors. Highly credible explanations are not susceptible to causal framing effects, but
they are sensitive to the effects of normatively relevant factors: the generalizability of an
explanation, and its statistical relevance for the evidence. These results advance current
literature in the philosophy and psychology of explanation in three ways. First, they yield
a more nuanced understanding of the determinants of judgments of explanatory power,
and the interaction between these factors. Second, they show the close relationship
between prior beliefs and explanatory power. Third, they elucidate the nature of abductive
reasoning.
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INTRODUCTION
Explanation is a central concept in human psychology. It supports a wide array of cognitive
functions, including reasoning, categorization, learning, inference, and decision-making (Brem
and Rips, 2000; Keil and Wilson, 2000; Keil, 2006; Lombrozo, 2006). When presented with an
explanation of why a certain event occurred, of how a certain mechanism works, or of why people
behave the way they do, both scientists and laypeople have strong intuitions about what counts as
a good explanation. Yet, more than 60 years after philosophers of science began to elucidate the
nature of explanation (Craik, 1943; Hempel and Oppenheim, 1948; Hempel, 1965; Carnap, 1966;
Salmon, 1970), the determinants of judgments of explanatory power remain unclear.
In this paper, we present five experiments on factors that may affect judgments of explanatory
power. Motivated by a large body of theoretical results in epistemology and philosophy of science,
as well as by a growing amount of empirical work in cognitive psychology (for respective surveys,
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see Lombrozo, 2012; Woodward, 2014), we examine how
judgments of explanatory power are affected by (i) the prior
credibility of an explanatory hypothesis, (ii) the causal framing
of the hypothesis, (iii) the perceived generalizability of the
explanation, and (iv) the statistical relevance between hypothesis
and evidence.
Specifically, we set out to test four hypotheses. First, we
hypothesized that the prior credibility of a causal explanation
predicts judgments of explanatory power. Throughout all five
experiments, we manipulated the prior credibility of different
explanations, and examined the effects of this manipulation
on explanatory judgments. We also wanted to understand how
low and high prior credibility interacted with other possible
psychological determinants of explanatory power.
Our focus on the prior credibility of causal explanation was
motivated by the fact that most philosophical and psychological
analyses of explanatory power agree that powerful explanations
provide information about credible causal relationships (Salmon,
1984; Lewis, 1986; Dowe, 2000). Credible causal information
facilitates the manipulation and control of natural phenomena
(Pearl, 2000; Woodward, 2003; Strevens, 2008) and plays
distinctive roles in human psychology (Lombrozo, 2011; Sloman
and Lagnado, 2015). For example, credible causal information
guides categorization (Carey, 1985; Murphy and Medin, 1985;
Lombrozo, 2009), supports inductive inference and learning
(Holyoak and Cheng, 2011; Legare and Lombrozo, 2014; Walker
et al., 2014), and calibrates metacognitive strategies involved in
problem-solving (Chi et al., 1994; Aleven and Koedinger, 2002).
While the prior credibility of an explanation may be
an important determinant of explanatory power, in previous
research we found that prior probabilities of candidate
explanatory hypotheses had no impact on explanatory judgment
when they were presented as objective, numerical base rates
(Colombo et al., 2016a), which was consistent with the well-
documented phenomenon of base rate neglect (Tversky and
Kahneman, 1982). Thus, we decided to focus on the subjective
prior credibility of an explanation in the present study, in order
to better evaluate the effects of prior credibility on explanation.
Our second, related hypothesis was that presenting
an explanatory hypothesis in causal terms predicts judgments
of its explanatory power. Thus, we wanted to find out whether
people’s explanatory judgments are sensitive to causal framing
effects.
The importance of this issue should be clear in the light
of the fact that magazines and newspapers very often, even
when it’s not warranted, describe scientific explanations in
terms of causal language (e.g., “Processed meat causes cancer”
or “Economic recession leads to xenophobic violence”) with
the aim of capturing readers’ attention and boosting their
sense of understanding (Entman, 1993; Scheufele and Scheufele,
2010). Thus, Experiments 1 and 2 examined the impact and
interaction of prior credibility and causal framing on judgments
of explanatory power.
With Experiment 3, we tested the hypothesis that the
perceived generalizability of an explanation influences
explanatory power. Specifically, in our experiments, we
operationalized “generalizability” in terms of the size of a sample
involved in a study, since the sample size is an obvious, crucial
feature of any study in which the aim is to make inferences
about a population from a sample. Thus, in our experiments,
we aimed to isolate the effects of the perceived generalizability
of an explanation, operationalized in terms of sample size, on
judgments of explanatory power and its interaction with the
prior credibility of an explanation, while controlling for causal
framing and statistical relevance.
While the generalizability of scientific results is an obvious
epistemic virtue that figures in the evidential assessments made
by scientists, it is less clear how lay people understand and
use this notion in making explanatory judgments. Previous
psychological findings about the role of generalizability
in explanatory reasoning are mixed and rely on different
operationalizations of generalizability. Read and Marcus-
Newhall (1993) operationalized generality in terms of the
number of facts that an explanation can account for. For
example, given the facts that Silvia has an upset stomach and that
Silvia has been gaining weight lately, the explanation that Silvia
is pregnant is more general than the explanation that Silvia has
stopped exercising. With this operationalization in place, Read
andMarcus-Newhall (1993) found that generalizability predicted
explanatory judgments. Preston and Epley (2005) understood
generalizability in terms of the number of implications or
observations that a research finding would explain. They showed
that hypotheses that would explain a wide range of observations
were judged as more valuable. However, these studies involved
no uncertainty about whether or not a causal effect was actually
observed (cf., Khemlani et al., 2011), and they did not examine
different ways in which people might understand when a
hypothesis is generalizable.
With Experiments 4 and 5, we tested our fourth and final
hypothesis: that the statistical relevance of a hypothesis for a body
of observed evidence is another key determinant of judgments of
explanatory power.
According to several philosophers, the power of an
explanation is manifest in the amount of statistical information
that an explanans H provides about an explanandum E, given
some class or population S. In particular, it has to be the case
that Prob (E|H&S) > Prob (E|S) (Jeffrey, 1969; Greeno, 1970;
Salmon, 1970). Suppose, for example, that Jones has strep
infection, and his doctor gives him penicillin. After Jones has
taken penicillin, he recovers within 1 week. When we explain
why Jones recovered, we usually cite statistically relevant facts,
such as the different recovery rates among treated and untreated
patients.
Developing this idea, several research groups have put forward
probabilistic measures of explanatory power (McGrew, 2003;
Schupbach and Sprenger’s, 2011; Crupi and Tentori, 2012).
Their approach is that a hypothesis is the more explanatorily
powerful the less surprising it makes the observed evidence.
Results from experimental psychology confirm this insight.
Schupbach (2011) provided evidence that Schupbach and
Sprenger’s (2011) probabilistic measure is an accurate predictor
of people’s explanatory judgments in abstract reasoning problems
(though see Glymour, 2015). Colombo et al. (2016a) found that
explanatory judgments about everyday situations are strongly
affected by changes in statistical relevance. Despite these results,
it remains unclear how statistical relevance interacts with other
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factors to determine explanatory power, in particular the prior
credibility of an explanation. Experiments 4 and 5 examine the
influence of statistical relevance in this regard, both for numerical
and for visual representation of the statistical information.
Clarifying the respective impact of prior credibility and
statistical relevance on judgments of explanatory power matters
to another central topic in the philosophy and psychology of
explanation: abductive reasoning (Salmon, 1989; Lipton, 2004;
Douven, 2011; Schupbach, 2017). When people engage in
abductive reasoning, they rely on explanatory considerations
to justify the conclusion that a certain hypothesis is true.
Specifically, people often infer the truth of that hypothesis H1
from a pool of candidate hypotheses H1, H2, ..., Hn, that best
explains available evidence E (Thagard, 1989; Douven, 2011).
However, whether “best explains” consists in high statistical
relevance, generalizability, provision of a plausible cause or some
other explanatory virtue remains controversial (Van Fraassen,
1989; Okasha, 2000; Lipton, 2001, 2004; Douven and Schupbach,
2015). Moreover, given the numerous biases in probabilistic
reasoning (Kahneman and Tversky, 1982; Hahn and Harris,
2014), it is not clear whether and how statistical relevance will
affect explanatory judgment.
In summary, bringing together different strands of research
from philosophy and psychology, our study asks: How do
the credibility, causal framing, statistical relevance, and
perceived generalizability of a hypothesis influence judgments of
explanatory power?
The pattern of our experimental findings supports the
hypothesis that the prior credibility of a causal explanation plays
a central role in explanatory reasoning: first, because of the
presence of strong main effects on judgments of explanatory
power, and second, because of the gate-keeping role it had for
other factors. Highly credible explanations were not susceptible
to causal framing effects, which may lead astray explanatory
judgment. Instead, highly credible hypotheses were sensitive
to the effects of factors which are usually considered relevant
from a normative point of view: perceived generalizability of an
explanation, and its statistical relevance, operationalized as the
strength of association between two relevant properties.
These results advance current literature in the philosophy
and psychology of explanation in three ways. First, our results
yield a more nuanced understanding of the determinants of
judgments of explanatory power, and the interaction between
these factors. Second, they show the close relationship between
prior beliefs and explanatory power. Third, they elucidate the
nature of abductive reasoning.
OVERVIEW OF THE EXPERIMENTS AND
PRE-TESTS
We conducted five experiments, where we systematically
examined the influence of the possible determinants of
explanatory judgment: prior credibility, causal framing,
perceived generalizability, and statistical relevance. To warrant
the validity of the experimental material, we conducted a series
of pre-studies, where participants evaluated different levels
TABLE 1 | Wordings that were perceived to express weak, neutral, and strong
causal framing of the relationship between an explanans (X) and an explanandum
(Y).
Causal Framing Framing of the hypothesis
Weak X is associated with Y
Neutral X co-occurs with Y
Strong X causes Y2
Strong X leads to Y
According to the ratings observed in the pre-study, “X causes Y” and “Y leads to Y” express
causal relations to an equal extent.
of causal framing, credibility, and generalizability. Materials
which corresponded to high, low, and neutral levels of these
three factors were implemented in the vignettes of our five
experiments, either as independent variables or as control
variables. Material evaluation and main experiments were both
conducted online on Amazon Mechanical Turk, utilizing the
Qualtrics Survey Software. We only allowedMTurk workers with
an approval rate >95% and with a number of HITs approved
>5,000 to submit responses. Instructions and material were
presented in English. None of the participants took part in more
than one experiment.
Causal Framing
In a pre-study, a sample of N = 44 participants (mean age
30.5 years, SD = 7.3, 28 male) from America (n = 27) and
other countries rated eight brief statements, expressing relations
between two variables X and Y of the type “X co-occurs with
Y”; “X is associated with Y,” and so on (see Appendix A in
Supplementary Material for the complete list of statements). The
statements were presented in an individually randomized order
to the participants; only one statement was visible at a time;
and going back to previous statements was not possible. The
participants judged how strongly they agreed or disagreed that a
certain statement expressed a causal relation between X and Y.
Judgments were collected on a 7-point scale with the options:
“I strongly disagree” (−3), “I disagree,” “I slightly disagree,” “I
neither agree nor disagree” (0), “I slightly agree,” “I agree,” “I
strongly agree” (3)1. Based on participants’ ratings, we selected
three types of statements for our main experiments: statements
with a neutral causal framing (“X co-occurs with Y”), with a weak
causal framing (“X is associated with Y”), and with a strong causal
framing (“X leads to Y” and “X causes Y”) (Table 1).
Prior Credibility
We identified the prior credibility of different hypotheses by
asking a new sample ofN = 42 participants (mean age 30.7 years,
SD = 7.5, 16 male) from America (n = 29) and other countries
to rate a list of 24 statements (Appendix A in Supplementary
Material). Participants judged how strongly they disagreed or
agreed that a certain hypothesis was credible. For all hypotheses,
we used the phrasing “... co-occurs with...” to avoid the influence
1Only the verbal labels (from “I strongly agree” through “I strongly disagree” were
visible for the participants. The assigned values (-3 through 3) were unknown to
participants.
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TABLE 2 | The four hypotheses rated as least credible and as most credible.
Credibility Hypothesis
Low Eating pizza co-occurs with immunity to flu.
Low Drinking apple juice co-occurs with anorexia.
High Well-being co-occurs with frequent smiling.
High Consuming anabolic steroids co-occurs with physical strength.
of causal framing2. Based on participants’ ratings (see Appendix
A in Supplementary Material), we selected four statements to use
in our main experiments: two were highly credible, the other two
were highly incredible (Table 2).
Generalizability
We conducted a pre-study in order to determine how the
description of the sample used in a scientific study influenced
the perceived generalizability of the study’s results; that is,
people’s perception that a given study’s result applies to many
individuals in the general population beyond the sample involved
in the study. This pre-study included two questionnaires, which
were administered to two different groups of participants. One
questionnaire presented descriptions of the samples used in
scientific studies, which varied with regard to the number of
people involved. The other questionnaire presented sample
descriptions that varied with regard to the type of people in
the sample. The statements were presented in an individually
randomized order to the participants. Only one statement was
visible at a time, and going back to previous statements was not
possible.
Forty-two participants (mean age 33.5 years, SD = 10.8,
27 male) from America (n = 38) and other countries were
presented with a list of six brief statements about a sample of a
particular number of participants, e.g., “The study investigates 5
people”; “The study investigates 500 people” (see Appendix A in
SupplementaryMaterial for the complete list of items). We found
that the perceived generalizability of a study increased with the
number of people in the sample of the study.
A new group of N = 41 participants (mean age 33.0
years, SD = 9.7, 26 male) from America (n = 36) and other
countries was presented with a list of nine brief statements
about samples of particular types of people, e.g., “The study
investigates a group of people who sit in a park”; “The study
investigates a group of people who work at a university” (see
Appendix A in Supplementary Material for the complete list
of items). However, focusing on the number instead of the
type of people in the sample allowed for a neater distinction
between narrowly and widely generalizable results. Therefore,
we characterized perceived generalizability as a function of the
2Different content as well as differences in causal framing may obviously change
the credibility of a given hypothesis. One reason why causal language changes
the credibility of particular hypotheses is that co-occurrence and association are
symmetric relations, whereas causation is an asymmetric relation. For example,
“Liver cancer co-occurs with drinking alcohol” and “Drinking alcohol co-occurs
with liver cancer” are both equally credible. Instead, “Liver cancer causes drinking
alcohol.” is much less credible than “Drinking alcohol causes liver cancer.”
TABLE 3 | Ratings of the generalizability of studies in the pre-tests, dependent of
the number of people in the sample.
Generalizability Description
Narrow The study investigates five people.
Medium The study investigates 240 people.
Wide The study investigates 10,000 people.
number of participants in the main vignettes of the experiment
(see Table 3)3.
Vignettes of the Main Experiment
All experiments were performed, using a 2 × 2 (within-subject)
design with explanatory power as dependent variable and prior
credibility of the hypothesis being one of the independent
variables. The other independent variable was either causal
framing, generalizability, or statistical relevance of the reported
research study.
Participants were presented with four short reports about
fictitious research studies. Two of these reports involved highly
credible hypotheses, the other two reports involved incredible
hypotheses. Two reports showed a high level of the other
independent variable (causal framing/generalizability/statistical
relevance), while the other two reports showed a low level of that
variable. To account for the possible influence of the content of
a particular report, the allocation of low and high levels of that
variable was counterbalanced to the credibility conditions across
the items, leading to two versions of each experiment.
Each vignette in our experiments followed the same format,
including a headline and five sentences. The headline stated the
hypothesis, the first sentence introduced the study, the second
sentence described the sample size, the third sentence reported
the results of the study, and the fourth sentence reported factors
controlled by the researchers. The final sentence presented a
brief conclusion, essentially restating the hypothesis. We now
present a sample vignette for a study that investigates the link
between anabolic steroids and physical strength. For details of the
vignettes in the individual experiments, see Appendices B–D in
Supplementary Material.
Consuming Anabolic Steroids Leads to Physical
Strength
A recent study by university researchers investigated the link
between consuming anabolic steroids and physical strength. The
researchers studied 240 persons. The level of physical strength
was higher among participants who regularly consumed anabolic
steroids than among the participants who did not regularly
consume anabolic steroids. Family health history, age, and sex,
which were controlled by the researchers, could not explain
these results. The study therefore supports the hypothesis that
consuming anabolic steroids leads to physical strength.
3From a statistical point of view, a larger sample size need not actually affect
the generalizability of a result. Sample size affects, instead, confidence levels and
margins of error, power and effect sizes.
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FIGURE 1 | A schematic representation of the components of an explanation.
In our vignettes, the explanatory hypothesis postulates a causal relationship
(e.g., “consuming anabolic steroids leads to physical strength”); the
explanandum states the result of the study (e.g., higher rate of physical
strength in the treatment group).
In all experiments, we varied the level of prior credibility
of a hypothesis. In Experiments 1 and 2, we also varied
the causal framing and interchanged “leads to” with “causes”
and “is associated with,” while we kept generalizability at its
control value (N = 240) and did not provide information about
statistical relevance. In Experiment 3, we varied the sample size
(=generalizability) and controlled for causal framing by using the
predicate “co-occurs with” in the headline and the conclusion.
Finally, in Experiments 4 and 5, we varied the levels of statistical
relevance (=the frequency of a causal effect in the treatment and
in the control group) while controlling for causal framing (“X co-
occurs with Y”) and generalizability (N = 240). See Figure 1 for a
schematic representation of the components of an explanation. In
this picture, two of our four independent variables are properties
of the explanatory hypothesis (prior credibility, causal framing)
while generalizability of the results pertains to the explanandum
(=the study results) in relation to the background conditions
(=study design and population). Similarly, statistical relevance
expresses a property of the explanandum with respect to the
explanatory hypothesis.
Participants were asked to rate our dependent variable: the
explanatory power of the stated hypothesis for the results of
the study. Specifically, participants were asked to indicate on a
Likert scale the extent to which they agreed or disagreed that a
target hypothesis explained the experimental results presented
in a vignette. A Likert scale was employed for its simplicity in
use and understanding, although responses are not obviously
translated into numerical values that may pick out different
degrees of explanatory power. Given that we were interested in
the power of explanations relative to variation in the values of
possible determinants of explanatory power, we expected that an
“agreement scale” to be sufficient to test the relative impact of
different factors.4
4As a reviewer helpfully pointed out, we might have asked participants the direct
question: “How well in your opinion does the hypothesis H explain results E?”
EXPERIMENTS 1 AND 2. CREDIBILITY ×
CAUSAL FRAMING
Two-hundred-three participants (mean age 34.7 years, SD =
10.5; 121 male) from America (n = 130), India (n = 67) and
other countries completed Experiment 1 for a small monetary
payment. A new sample of two-hundred-eight participants
(mean age 34.56 years, SD = 9.97; 124 male) from America (n =
154), India (n = 43), and other countries completed Experiment
2 for a small monetary payment.
Design and Material
In both experiments, participants were presented with four short
reports about fictitious research studies along the lines of the
above vignette. Across vignettes, we manipulated the causal
framing of the relationship between hypothesis and evidence as
well as the choice of the hypothesis (credible vs. incredible).
Generalizability was controlled for by setting it to its medium
value (240 participants). Two of the four reports involved highly
credible hypotheses, the other two reports involved incredible
hypotheses. Similarly, two of these reports used weak causal
framing (Experiments 1 and 2: “X is associated with Y”) while
the other two reports used strong causal framing (Experiment
1: “X leads to Y,” Experiment 2: “X causes Y”). In other words,
Experiment 1 used implicit causal language and Experiment 2
used explicit causal language, while the experiments were, for the
rest, identical with respect to design, materials, and procedure.
To account for the possible influence of the content of a
particular report, we counterbalanced the allocation of weak and
strong causal framing conditions to the credibility conditions
across the items, and created two versions of the experiments:
Version A and B (see Appendix B in Supplementary Material
for details). The order of reports was individually randomized for
each participant.
Procedure
Participants judged each report in terms of the explanatory
power of the hypothesis it described. Specifically, participants
considered the statement: “The researchers’ hypothesis explains
the results of the study,” and expressed their judgments on a 7-
point scale with the extremes (−3) “I strongly disagree” and (3)
“I strongly agree,” and the center pole (0) “I neither disagree nor
agree.”
Analysis and Results
Separate two-way ANOVAs were calculated for Experiments
1 and 2, with the factors Credibility (low, high) and Causal
Framing (weak, strong). ANOVA of Experiment 1 (implicit
causal language) revealed a main effect of Credibility, F(1,202)
= 84.5; p < 0.001; η2part = 0.30. There was no main effect
In principle, people can in fact strongly agree that a given hypothesis H explains
the results of a study E, while they can hold at the same time that H is not a very
good explanation of E. This type of question may have given us a clearer picture
of participants’ absolute judgments of the explanatory power of H. Yet, this was
unnecessary for the purpose of our study, that is, for determining whether variation
in the value of various factors bring about significant changes in judgments of
explanatory power.
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of Causal Framing (p = 0.37), and no interaction (p = 0.08).
Pair-wise comparisons showed that incredible hypotheses were
rated significantly lower than credible hypotheses, independently
of the value of Causal Framing [incredible hypotheses: M =
0.26; SEM = 0.10; credible hypotheses: M = 1.14; SEM =
0.09; t-test: t(202) = −9.2; p < 0.001; d = 0.67]. See Figure 2.
The results of Experiment 1 therefore indicate that the prior
credibility of a hypothesis was a strong predictor of judgments
of explanatory power. Instead, framing a hypothesis with implicit
causal language did not have effects on explanatory judgment.
ANOVA of Experiment 2 (explicit causal language) revealed
main effects of Credibility [F(1, 207) = 286.9; p < 0.001; η
2
part
= 0.58] and Causal Framing, F(1, 207) = 31.0; p < 0.001; η
2
part
= 0.13, as well as a significant interaction Credibility × Causal
Framing, F(1, 207) = 37.6; p< 0.001; η
2
part = 0.15. Figure 3 shows
the effect sizes and the interaction between both factors as well as
the relevant descriptives.
FIGURE 2 | The graph shows explanatory power ratings for credible and
incredible statements in Experiment 1. Ratings were significantly higher for
credible as opposed to incredible statements. Error bars show standard errors
of the mean and are also expressed numerically, in parentheses next to the
mean value.
FIGURE 3 | The graph shows how explanatory power ratings vary with regard
to Credibility and Causal Framing (as presented in Experiment 2). Ratings were
significantly higher for statements with high compared to low Credibility, and
for statements with strong compared to weak Causal Framing. The graph
shows the (significant) interaction between both factors. Error bars show
standard errors of the mean and are also expressed numerically, in
parentheses next to the mean value.
The results of Experiment 2 therefore confirm that the
prior credibility of a hypothesis is a strong predictor of
judgments of the hypothesis’ explanatory power. Incredible
hypotheses received relatively lower explanatory power ratings,
while credible hypotheses received relatively higher ratings, t(207)
= −16.936; p < 0.001; d = 1.347. The results also showed that
explicit causal framing can increase ratings of explanatory power,
but only for incredible hypotheses, t(207) = −7.253; p < 0.001;
d = 0.545. While this effect may lead explanatory judgment
astray, in most practical cases of explanatory reasoning, people
are interested in the explanatory power of hypotheses which they
find, at least to a certain extent, credible. As Figure 3 shows, there
was no effect of causal framing on explanatory power in this
important case.
All in all, the observed patterns in both experiments confirm
that the prior credibility of a hypothesis plays a gate-keeping-role
in explanatory reasoning: only credible causal hypotheses qualify
as explanatorily valuable. Implicit or explicit causal framing plays
a small to negligible role in influencing judgments of explanatory
power.
EXPERIMENT 3: CREDIBILITY ×
GENERALIZABILITY
Participants
Two-hundred-seven participants (mean age 33.4 years, SD =
9.1; 123 male) from America (n = 156), India (n = 37) and
other countries completed Experiment 3 for a small monetary
payment.
Design and Material
The experiment resembled Experiments 1 and 2. Four vignettes,
each of which included a headline and five sentences, presented
credible and incredible hypotheses. The relation between
hypothesis and evidence was expressed by using the causally
neutral wording “X co-occurs with Y.” The critical manipulation
concerned the sample descriptions used in the vignettes, which
expressed either narrowly or widely generalizable results. For
narrowly generalizable results, the second sentence of a report
indicated that the sample of the study encompassed around 5
people (e.g., “The researchers studied 6 people”). For widely
generalizable results, the sample included about 10,000 people
(wide generalizability condition, e.g., “The researchers studied
9,891 people”).
To control for the possible influence of the content of a
particular report, we counterbalanced the allocation of narrow
and wide generalizability conditions to the credibility conditions
across the items, and created two versions of the experiment
(see Appendix C in Supplementary Material for detailed
information). The order in which reports were presented to the
participants was individually randomized for each participant.
Procedure
Participants were asked to carefully assess each report with regard
to Explanatory Power. Participants’ ratings were collected on 7-
point scales, with the extreme poles (−3) “I strongly disagree” and
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(3) “I strongly agree,” and the center pole (0) “I neither disagree
nor agree.”
Analysis and Results
The ratings were analyzed with a two-way ANOVA with the
factors Credibility (low, high) and Generalizability (narrow,
wide). ANOVA revealed significant main effects of Credibility,
F(1,206) = 83.830; p < 0.001; η
2
part = 0.289; and Generalizability,
F(1,206) = 29.593; p < 0.001; η
2
part = 0.126, and no interaction
Credibility× Generalizability (p= 0.085, n.s.).
As with Experiments 1 and 2, credible hypotheses achieved
significantly higher ratings than incredible hypotheses
[incredible hypotheses: M = −0.01; SEM = 0.10; credible
hypotheses: M = 0.95; SEM = 0.08; t-test: t(206) = −9.2; p <
0.001; d = 0.72]. Furthermore, reports with wide generalizability
achieved significantly higher ratings compared to reports with
narrow generalizability [narrow:M = 0.21; SEM = 0.10; credible
hypotheses: M = 0.73; SEM = 0.08; t(206) = −5.4; p < 0.001;
d = 0.40]. Figures 4 and 5 show the main effects for both
variables.
EXPERIMENTS 4 AND 5: CREDIBILITY ×
STATISTICAL RELEVANCE
Experiments 4 and 5 examined in what way probabilistic
information influences explanatory judgments and how
statistical information is taken into account for credible vs.
incredible hypotheses. Experiment 4 presented the statistical
information numerically, Experiment 5 presented it visually.
Participants
Two-hundred-three participants (mean age 34.7 years, SD =
9.5; 122 male) from America (n = 168), India (n = 15), and
other countries completed Experiment 4 for a small monetary
payment. A new sample of N = 208 participants (mean age: 36.0
years, SD = 19.7; 133 male), from America (n = 122), India
FIGURE 4 | The graph shows how explanatory power ratings vary with regard
to Credibility. Ratings were significantly higher for statements with high
compared to low Credibility. The graph shows the main effect for this factor.
Error bars show standard errors of the mean and are also expressed
numerically, in parentheses next to the mean value.
(n= 69), and other countries completed Experiment 5 for a small
monetary payment.
Design and Material
The experiments resembled the previous ones. The four
vignettes presented credible and incredible hypotheses. The
sample descriptions in the vignettes were chosen such that
both, generalizability and causality, were perceived as “neutral,”
according to the results of our pre-study. This meant that we
opted for a medium-sized population sample of 240 persons
(like in Experiments 1 and 2) and the wording “X co-occurs
with Y” (like in Experiment 3). The novel manipulation was
implemented in the part of the vignette where the results
of the study are reported. This part now included statistical
information. In a case of weak statistical relevance, the frequency
of the property of interest was almost equal in the treatment
and control group, e.g.,: “Among the participants who regularly
consumed anabolic steroids, 26 out of 120 (= 22%) exhibited an
exceptional level of physical strength. Among the participants
who did not regularly consume anabolic steroids, 24 out of 120
(= 20%) exhibited an exceptional level of physical strength.”
For strong statistical relevance, there was a notable difference
in the frequency of the property of interest, e.g.,: “Among
the participants who regularly consumed anabolic steroids, 50
out of 120 (= 42%) exhibited an exceptional level of physical
strength. Among the participants who did not regularly consume
anabolic steroids, 7 out of 120 (= 6%) exhibited an exceptional
level of physical strength.” While Experiment 4 represented
the statistical information numerically like in the previous
sentences, Experiment 5 stated the same absolute numbers and
replaced the accompanying percentages with two pie charts (see
Figure 6).
As in the previous experiments, we counterbalanced the
allocation of the weak statistical relevance and strong statistical
relevance conditions across the items, and created two versions
of each experiment (see Appendix D in Supplementary Material
FIGURE 5 | The graph shows how explanatory power ratings vary with regard
to Generalizability. Ratings were significantly higher for statements with high
compared to low Generalizability. The graph shows the main effect for this
factor. Error bars show standard errors of the mean and are also expressed
numerically, in parentheses next to the mean value.
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FIGURE 6 | Visual representation of statistical information of the fictitious research groups as provided in Experiment 5.
for detailed information). The order of reports was individually
randomized for each participant.
Procedure
Participants were asked to carefully assess each report with regard
to Explanatory Power. Again, the ratings of the participants
were collected on 7-point scales, with the extreme poles (−3) “I
strongly disagree” and (3) “I strongly agree,” and the center pole
(0) “I neither disagree nor agree.”
Analysis and Results
Separate two-way ANOVAs were calculated for Experiments 4
and 5, with the factors Credibility (low, high) and Statistical
Relevance (weak, strong). ANOVA of Experiment 4 revealed
significant main effects of Credibility, F(1, 202) = 65.3; p < 0.001;
η
2
part = 0.24 and Statistical Relevance, F(1, 202) = 74.2; p <
0.001; η2part = 0.27, and a significant interaction Credibility ×
Statistical Relevance, F(1, 202) = 47.7; p< 0.001; η
2
part = 0.19.
Figure 7 shows the effect sizes and the interaction between
both factors as well as the relevant descriptive statistics. Relatively
high levels of explanatory power were only achieved for highly
credible hypotheses and high statistical relevance. The other
conditions roughly led to the same explanatory power ratings (p’s
> 0.25). This suggests that both factors act as a gate-keeper in
explanatory reasoning: if they take their low values, no hypothesis
can be rated as explanatorily powerful. On the other hand, if both
conditions are satisfied, the effect is very pronounced, t(202) =
−11.82; p< 0.001; d= 0.89 (comparison of high credible reports
with weak and strong statistical relevance).
Similar results were obtained for Experiment 5. ANOVA of
Experiment 5 revealed significant main effects of Credibility,
F(1, 207) = 38.2; p< 0.001; η
2
part = 0.16, and Statistical Relevance,
F(1, 207) = 152.5; p < 0.001; η
2
part = 0.42, and a significant
interaction Credibility × Statistical Relevance, F(1, 207) = 47.4; p
< 0.001; η2part = 0.10.
Figure 8 shows the effect sizes and the interaction between
both factors as well as the relevant descriptives. We found a
slightly different interaction pattern than in Experiment 4. Again,
FIGURE 7 | The graph shows how explanatory power ratings vary with regard
to Credibility and Statistical Relevance (as presented in Experiment 4). Ratings
were significantly higher for statements with high compared to low Credibility,
and for statements with high compared to low Statistical Relevance. The
graph shows the (significant) interaction between both factors. Error bars
show standard errors of the mean and are also expressed numerically, in
parentheses next to the mean value.
both variables have to take their high values for a hypothesis to
be rated as explanatorily powerful. However, we also see that the
gate-keeping role of both variables is weaker than in the case
where statistical information was only presented numerically:
t(207) = −8.85; p < 0.001; d = 0.71 (comparison of low credible
reports with weak and strong statistical relevance) and t(207)
= −13.19; p < 0.001; d = 0.69 (comparison of high credible
reports with weak and strong statistical relevance). Either variable
taking its high value suffices for a judgment of relatively high
explanatory power. Like in Experiment 4, the level of explanatory
power was by far the highest in the condition where both
credibility and statistical relevance were high. These findings
also resonate well with the more normatively oriented literature
on statistical explanation which sees explanatory power as an
increasing function of the surprisingness of the explanandum
(Hempel, 1965; Salmon, 1971; Schupbach and Sprenger’s, 2011;
Crupi and Tentori, 2012). Weak statistical associations are
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FIGURE 8 | The graph shows how explanatory power ratings vary with regard
to Credibility and Statistical Relevance (as presented in Experiment 5). Ratings
were significantly higher for statements with high compared to low Credibility,
and for statements with high compared to low Statistical Relevance. The
graph shows the (significant) interaction between both factors. Error bars
show standard errors of the mean and are also expressed numerically, in
parentheses next to the mean value.
less surprising than strong associations, therefore an adequate
explanatory hypothesis (i.e., a hypothesis that postulates the right
sort of causal relationship) is more powerful in the latter case,
ceteris paribus.
DISCUSSION
We examined the impact of four factors—prior credibility, causal
framing, perceived generalizability, and statistical relevance—on
judgments of explanatory power. In a series of five experiments,
we varied both the subjective credibility of an explanation
and one of the other factors: causal framing, generalizability,
and statistical relevance (both with numeric and with visual
presentation of the statistics). In Experiments 1 and 2 we
found that the impact of causal language on judgments of
explanatory power was small to negligible. Experiment 3 showed
that explanations with wider scope positively affected judgments
of explanatory power. In Experiments 4 and 5, we found that
explanatory power increased with the statistical relevance of the
explanatory hypothesis for the observed evidence.
Across all experiments, we found that the prior subjective
credibility of a hypothesis had a striking effect on how
participants assessed explanatory power. In particular, the
credibility of an explanatory hypothesis had an important
gate-keeping function: the impact of statistical relevance on
explanatory power was more significant when credibility was
high. On the other hand, the high credibility of a hypothesis
controlled for the potentially misleading effect of causal framing
on explanatory judgment.
This pattern of findings is consistent with existing
psychological research demonstrating that people resist
endorsing explanatory hypotheses that appear unnatural
and unintuitive, given their background common-sense
understanding of the physical and of the social world (Bloom
and Weisberg, 2007). Our findings are also consistent with the
idea that stable background personal ideologies (often referred
to as “worldview”) can reliably predict whether people are likely
to reject well-confirmed scientific hypotheses (Lewandowsky
et al., 2013; Colombo et al., 2016b). So, scientific hypotheses
that are inconsistent with our prior background beliefs are
likely to be judged as implausible, and may not be endorsed as
good explanations unless they are supported by extra-ordinary
evidence gathered by some trustworthy source. On the other
hand, for hypotheses that fit our prior, background belief or
ideology, we often focus on information that, if the candidate
explanatory hypothesis is true, would boost its goodness
(Klayman and Ha, 1987).
This kind of psychological process of biased evidence
evaluation and retention bears a similarity to the properties of
incremental measures of confirmation called Matthew properties
(Festa, 2012). According to confirmation measures presenting
Matthews properties, an equal degree of statistical relevance
leads to higher (incremental) confirmation when the hypothesis
is already credible than when it is incredible. The same was
observed in our experiment, where the effect of statistical
relevance on different dimensions of explanatory power was
much more pronounced for credible than for incredible
hypotheses. Moreover, the highest ratings of explanatory power,
across different experiments, were achieved when, in addition
to a credible hypothesis, the report was perceived as widely
generalizable, its statistical relevance for the observed results was
high. Only in those cases, a relatively higher degree of explanatory
power was achieved. This confirms that those factors play a
crucial role in explanatory reasoning: the more an explanation
is perceived to be credible, statistically relevant and widely
generalizable, the higher its perceived explanatory power.
The interplay we observed between statistical relevance,
prior credibility, and explanatory power is also relevant to
understanding the nature of abductive reasoning. In abductive
reasoning, explanatory considerations are taken to boost the
credibility of a target hypothesis while inducing a sense of
understanding (Lipton, 2004). We showed that high prior
credibility may insulate an explanation from causal framing
effects. However, when an explanation is surprising or otherwise
incredible, like most of the explanations that feature in
newspapers and magazines, causal framing may increase the
perceived power of the explanation, producing a deceptive
sense of understanding (Rozenblit and Keil, 2002; Trout,
2002). Moreover, while previous studies investigated the role
of simplicity and coherence in abductive reasoning (Lombrozo,
2007; Koslowski et al., 2008; Bonawitz and Lombrozo, 2012),
our results extend this body of literature by showing how
the generalizability of a hypothesis and its statistical relevance
influence the perceived quality of an explanation.
Overall, our experiments show that explanatory power
is a complex concept, affected by considerations of prior
credibility of a (causal) hypothesis, generalizability and statistical
relevance. These factors also figure prominently in (normative)
philosophical theories of explanation. For instance, the D-N
model (Hempel, 1965) stresses the generality of the proposed
explanation, the causal-mechanical account (Woodward, 2003)
requires a credible causal mechanism, and statistical explanations
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are usually ranked according to their relevance for the observed
evidence (Salmon, 1970; Schupbach and Sprenger’s, 2011).
On the other hand, the multitude of relevant factors in
explanatory judgment explains why it has been difficult to come
up with a theory of abductive inference that is both normatively
compelling and descriptively accurate: after all, it is difficult
to fit quite diverse determinants of explanatory judgment into
a single unifying framework. In that spirit, we hope that our
results will promote an interdisciplinary conversation between
empirical evidence and philosophical theorizing, and about
the “prospects for a naturalized philosophy of explanation”
in particular (Lombrozo, 2011; Colombo, 2017; Schupbach,
2017).
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